I Think Therefore I Am: A Philosophical Challenge
I Think Therefore I Am: A Philosophical Challenge
Nima Shakouri is currently the faculty member of Roudbar Branch, Islamic Azad University, Iran. He has taught English courses for over a decade at different universities. Moreover, he has published nationally and internationally.Email: shakouri.ni@gmail.com
Reihaneh Sheikhy Behdani is a member of the faculty of English language teaching and translation at Islamic Azad University, Lahijan Branch. She has taught English for several years. She has published a number of articles in the field of TEFL. Email: reihaneh.sheikhy322@gmail.com
Menu
Abstract
Introduction
On the relations between thought and language
A contrastive look
Final remarks
References
Enacted in the philosophy of language is a growing interest in analyzing the relationship between language and thought. What has become a bone of contention among scholars was the very argument between the two schools of rationalism and relativism that has not yet dissolved. Henceforth, the present paper, though interested in acommensurable perspective regarding thought-language relationship, is in an attempt at mulling over the current debates on this issue.
The tension among the scholars (e.g., Sapir, 1921; Vygotsky, 1978) who insist on the coterminous relationship between thought and language and the ones (e.g., Chomsky, 1983) who prefer to raise an independent epistemology between thought and language is not a new issue. The starting point of all research aimingat the relationship between language and thought, as Birjandi and Sabah (2012) claim, "is Saussure’s idea that the language system segments the reality into conceptual chunks, thereby imposing categories by which people perceive and understand the world" (p. 51). In this regard, the paper is going to provide an overview regarding different perspectives offered for language-thought debate.
So much has been written regarding the relationship between language and thought. Let’s begin with a famous maxim by the French philosopher, Rene Descartes (cited in Clarke, 2006, p. 10): “I think therefore I am”. Descartes reasoned that his existence is based on his ability to think. In this regard, Dewey (1910) asserts no words are more often on lips than thinking and thought. However, what is meant by thinking? Is thinking a necessary predecessor to language?
To better appreciate the nature of such debate, let’s begin with two extreme positions concerning the relationship between thought and language that are commonly referred to as ‘mould theories’ and ‘cloak theories’ (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956, cited in Chandler, 1994, p. 1). Mould theories, such as Sapir-Whorf theory, represent language metaphorically as a mould in terms of which thought categories are cast (Bruner et al. 1956). Cloak theories, in contrast, adopted by the extreme universalism (Chandler, 1994), represent the view that language is a cloak or dress conforming to the customary categories of thought of its speakers. In fact, considering language as a dress of thought implies that the same thought can be expressed in various ways (Bruner et al, 1956). That is, it is the thought that customizes language.
The view that language shapes thought has been first put forward by Sapir and Whorf (Carroll, 1994). In other words, to them, language plays a formative and central role in shaping thought itself. As Whorf (1956) contends, the basic principles of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be traced as follows:
No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. The person most nearly free in such respects would be a linguist familiar with very many widely different linguistic systems. As yet no linguist is in any such position.We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated. (p. 214)
Sapir (1921), in providing an answer to the question whether thought is possible without speech, puts forth, “language and thoughts are not strictly coterminous” (p. 14). Put differently, language is primarily a pre-rational function; it works up to the thought that is latent in. To Sapir, "language determines thought" (Michael, 2002, p. 108). This type of determinism is called language determinism. Language determinism is heavily influenced by the founder of anthropology—Franz Boa (Zahedi, 2008); in a sense, it is considered as an externalist approach. Two theorems of Sapir and Whorf hypothesis are: (1) linguistic relativity, that is, languages are different from one another in a unpredictable number of ways, and (2) linguistic determinism, namely, language shapes thought. As Zahedi (2008) claims, this hypothesis stands in opposition to both empiricists and rationalist doctrines. To Sapir and Whorf hypothesis, the automatic patterns of language are specific of each language; in fact, not all men are led by the same physical evidence—unless their physical backgrounds are similar. In much the same way, learning a language determines the way a person thinks. Put differently, speakers of different languages are said to think in different ways.
However, in1994, Pinker, confidently claim that what Sapir claims is “wrong, all wrong” (p. 57), and “bunk” (p. 65). Lack of evidence that a language influences a particular way of thinking is among the reasons that lead Pinker (1994) to dedicate a chapter to the absurdity of Whorfian relativism and determinism. Universalists, in contrast with relativists, argue that whatever we want to say in one language can always be translated into another (Chandler, 1994). As Chandler asserts, translatabilityis the basis for the most common refutation of Whorfianism. This ideology is certainly inspired by Popper’s (1970) philosophy that is elucidated in his ironic statement that “even totally different languages are not untranslatable" (p. 56).
Like Pinker (1994), Chomsky (1957) also takes a similar position. In Chomsky’s (1983) independent theory, language is considered as one aspect of cognition. To him, the forms and contents of all natural languages originate from a predetermined cognitive substance and architecture, and therefore, provide a rich diagnostic account of human conceptual commonalities. To Chomsky (1957), human beings are born with a special brain mechanism called LAD. This theory supposes that the ability to learn language is inborn; the nature is more important than the nurture. However, one problem with Chomsky’s theory is that it does not take enough account of the influence that thought and languagehave on each other’s development. However, Chomsky considers thought to pre exist language. In a nutshell, Chomsky goes on to hold that “language is a mirror of mind” (p.4). Indeed, through the study of natural languages, we may learn something about human nature. This implies thinking involves using language.
Among the psychologists who showed a strong inclination toward the relationship between language and thought are Piaget (1959) and Vygotsky (1986). Piaget (1959) holds language is the reflection of thought and language does not contribute to the development of thought. Unlike Chomsky and Piaget, Vygotsky’s (1986) central concern was the relationship between the development of thought and that of language. Vygotsky (1978), also, differs from Piaget in claiming that social interaction through language is a prerequisite to cognitive development. Vygotsky was interested in the ways in which languages might impact on how a person thinks. He holds thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them. Vygotsky, also, contends that the relationship between word and thought is a living process. Thought is born through words (Vygotsky, 1986). However, from Vygotsky’s social constructivist perspective, thought and language develop differently and have separate functions and roots. These two are not linked by a bond; rather, they develop autonomously (Birjandi& Sabah, 2012). Birjandi and Sabah continue, “since the relationship between thought and speech is ever-changing, their progress does not run parallel” (p. 54). They continue:
A prelinguistic phase in the development of thought and a preintellectual phase in the development of speech can be observed. Then, they melt and join at the age of two to initiate a new form of behavior. Thought turns out to be verbal, and speech happens to be rational. (p. 54).
More importantly, Vygotsky doesn’t explicitly elaborate on the issue that whether language influences thought or whether thought influences language. To him, in fact, up to certain point in time, these two develop independently, and later, as said earlier, thoughts turn out to be verbal and speech happens to be rational (Birjandi & Sabbah, 2012). In other words, they act dependently.
In English, as Loar (2006) claims, the noun ‘thought’ is ambiguous. It can mean what a person thinks; that is, the contents of acts of thinking—a proposition. In this case, talking about thought is philosophical, but it can also mean an act of thinking. In this sense, thoughts are psychological.
Whether thought and language are fused or segregated was always a matter of issue among philosophers. If we come to this probable conclusion that language and thoughts are segregated then we should pursue an answer to the thesis that which one precedes the other. In contrast, viewing that thought and language are fused is inspired by a reductionist perspective in philosophy. Among the earlier philosophers who were interested in the language-thought relationship was Benveniste (1971) who attempts to reduce thought to language in his metaphor of thought as a container which cannot be separated from itscontent. In other words, Benveniste’s argument is that language precedes thought, shapes it, and cannot be separated from it as the unconscious is structured by a language, a rather Lacanian move.
According to Loar (2006), the starting place in discussing the relation between language and thought begins with the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. As Loar (2006) declares Fregeis not concerned with thoughts as psychological states. To Frege, thoughts are the senses of statements. We might be tempted to say that senses are the meanings of linguistic statements and their components. Frege, as an analytic philosopher, is in favor of the same idea that thoughts are in language. They are not segregated, but they are fused. However, that we think in language we speak was first argued by Harman (1973, cited in Loar, 2006) that directly explains the idea of propositional attitudes. Propositions are supposed to play a dual role in thought and language relationship (Pollock, 1982). On the one hand, propositions are supposed to be the objects of belief and the vehicles of thought. Besides, propositions are supposed to be products of assertion. From this traditional perspective, when speakers assertively utter a sentence, what they assert is a proposition. This is what Pollock (1982) coined as The Propositional Theory of Meaning. Presumably, it is the meaning of the sentence which determines which proposition is thereby asserted. Thus, one can assert what one believes equals what one asserts (Pollock,1982). In sum, propositions are regarded as objects of beliefs. Henceforth, what makes traditional theory of language distinct is the view that statements and propositions are the same things (Pollock, 1982).
What sparks an image in our mind is the senses: touch, smell, taste, hear and possibly intuition (Hilanto, 2011). To Hilanto, most of our senses are essential to social interaction. Hearing and sight are used as mechanisms to gather input; the brain then processes the input, and generates some type of output. To better appreciate the necessity of thought before language, take this example. For those who are impaired or lack the capacity to hear or see, other senses may compensate. A blind person can use the sense of touch for input, running fingers across an object,or a deaf person could compensate by using sight to read the lips of the speaker. Now imagine a person is devoid of all senses. There would be a complete absence of input, and without input there cannot be language. However, if just one of these senses is operable, language is possible. Thus, what Hilanto asserts is that senses precedes language, and it is the senses that gather input and from the input, an image is created. The image that is constructed in the mind is the essence of what you receive by your senses and experiences. In contrast with Sapir (1921), Hilanto (2011) claims that the image resembles more a mental picture rather than a visual one. And from this mental image comes thought. Hilanto states that after the thought is formed, the mind begins preparing for the next stage of language: output. In a nutshell, if we assume that learning a language has a profound influence on a child’s mental life; then we should expect the speakers of different languages might think in very different ways. More specifically, in language learning, Smiths (2004) puts forth if a child’s language does not exploit a distinction, then the child loses the ability to notice it. Critically, Schlenker (2006) argues that coming to the side of Sapir involves assuming thought as symbol manipulation, but the symbols in question need not be part of verbal language; they may be part of what Pinker (1994) calls 'mentalese', which is just another term for 'language of thought' (Schlenker, 2006). To Pinker, it is possible to think without words. In Pinker’s mentalese, the mind functions like a computer manipulating simple symbols to produce complex results.
To make a long story short, the relationship between thought and language is not generally posed in the hope that someone will come up with a definite answer. What raises a bone of contention among scholars was the very debate between the two schools of rationalism and relativism that has not yet dissolved. Being in favor with rationalism, the present writers hold that the lack of evidence that a language influences a particular way of thinking is among the reasons that lead Pinker (1994) to dedicate a chapter to the absurdity of Whorfian relativism and determinism.
Furthermore, reviewing the history of language-thought debate reveals that Sapir (1921) as the pioneer of relativism in anthropology is concerned with the notion of incommensurability of languages. That is, languages cannot be translated into each other. The incommensurability of languages has a long history from Sapir to Boas and to Humbolt. However, what makes the precedence of thought to language more plausible is finding an answer to this question: how is it possible to assume people who use a language cannot understand a concept if it is lacking in their language?
Benveniste, E. (1971). Problems of general linguistics. Paris: Editions Gallimard.
Birjandi, P., &Sabah, S. (2012). A review of the language thought debate: Multivariant perspectives. BRAIN. Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience, 3 (1), 50-62.
Carroll, D. W. (1994). Psychology of language (2nd ed.). California: Brooks Publishing Company.
Chandler,D. (1994). TheSapir-Whorf hypothesis. Received 2012 from http:// www.aber.ac.uk/ media/Documents
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures.Paris:Mouton
Chomsky, N. (1975). Reflections on language.New York: Pantheon
Chomsky, N. (1983). Noam Chomsky’s views on the psychology of language and thought.In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), Dialogues on the psychology of language and thought (pp. 33-63). New York: Plenum
Clarke, D. S. (2006).Descartes: A biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Boston: D. C. Heath
Hilanto, T. (2011). On language use: A theoretical treaty on the workings of language. Retrieved 2012, from
www.gmu.edu/org/lingclub/WP/currentXML.php?Vol=8
Loar, B. (2006). Language, thought, and meaning. In M. Devitt& H. Richard (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of language (pp. 77-90). London: Blackwell Publishing.
Michael, L. (2002). Reformulating the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: Discourse, interaction and distributed cognition.Texas Linguistic Forum, 45, 107-116.
Piaget, J. (1959). The language and thought of the child. London: Routledge.
Pinker.S. (1994).The Language instinct.New York: William Morrow and Company Inc.
Pollock, J. L. (1982). Language and thought. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Popper, K. (1970). Normal science and dangers.In I. Lakatos& A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 51-58). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sapir, E. (1921). Language: An introduction of the study of speech. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Schlenker, P. (2006). Language and thought.Retrieved 2012 from vc.bridgew.edu/cgivIe wcontent. cgi?article=1029&context...rev
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vygotsky, L. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). A linguistic consideration of thinking in primitive communities.In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (pp. 65-86). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Zahedi, K. (2008). Determinist inquiries: Debates on the foundation of language. International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, 1(1), 26-50.
Please check the Making Thinking Visible course at Pilgrims website.
Please check the How to be a Teacher Trainer course at Pilgrims website.
|
